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1. Introduction
The German Retirement Saving Act (“Altersvermögensgesetz”
1), which passed the German
legislative body in May of 2001, instituted a new funded system of supplementary pensions
coupled with a general reduction in the level of state pay-as-you old-age pensions. The goal of
this new pension system is to cap and to stabilise the contributions of German employees to
the state pension system, which are currently 19.1% of their salary. Therefore, for compulsory
members of the state pension systems which are not already in retirement the maximum “first
pillar” state pension level is gradually cut from currently 70% to 67% until 2030 of the last
net salary before retirement.
2 To compensate for the cut in state pension payouts, individuals
will be able to invest voluntarily and on a pre-tax basis a part of their income in individual
pension accounts (“Altersvorsorgevertrag”, IPA).
3 Additional incentives to invest into the
IPAs are given by the government in the form of a tax relief on pension contributions, direct
subsidies for low income earners and extra contributions for children. In order to get the full
benefits, households will have to invest about 1% of their income (up to the social security
ceiling) into the pension system in 2002, increasing every two years by 1% reaching a
maximum of 4% in 2008. The investment income during the accumulation period is not
subject to income tax, whereas the payments in the distribution phase arising from the IPA
will be fully subject to income tax.
In general, individuals are free to make IPA pension investments in a wide array of products
offered by private-sector financial institutions. This allows participants to choose an
investment portfolio that is consistent with their individual preferences for risk and return.
However, in order to qualify for a tax credit, the IPA products have to satisfy a number of
criteria. These conditions are codified in a special law concerning the certification of
individual pension products (“Altersvorsorge-Zertifizierungsgesetz”) and supervised by a
special authority (“Zertifizierungsstelle”) belonging to the German Federal Financial
Supervisory Agency. The intention of the certification requirements is twofold:
1 This Act is also known as “Riester Reform”. Walter Riester is the German Labour Minister who is
responsible for the reform of the pension system in the year 2001. More formally, the reform as a whole
alters several existing laws including (among others) the social security law, the income tax law, the
occupational pensions law, the social welfare law, the civil law, the law governing investment
management companies, and the law governing insurance companies.
2 Similar to that, the maximum pension for civil servants is being reduced from currently 75% to 71.75%
of the last salary.
3 In addition, the government promotes also the “second pillar” occupational pension system, e.g. by
establishing a new funding vehicle called ”Pensionsfonds”.3
•  First, the government wants to ensure that individuals only use the (tax supported)
accumulated savings for a lifelong income stream in the post-retirement phase, and not
for consumption during pre-retirement.
•  Second, private (and often uninformed) investors paying into the new individual
pension plans should be protected against the risk of making “too bad” investment
decisions.
In the spirit of the first intention, investments in the personal pension accounts must be
preserved until employees reach the age of 60
4, and no distributions may be made during the
accumulation period. When the age of retirement is reached, the accumulated assets be drawn
down in the form of a lifelong annuity or a capital withdrawal plan which must (partly) revert
into an annuity at the age of 85.
5 To provide transparency, the providers of IPA’s must
disclose the nature and level of fees (e.g. to cover distribution and/or administrative costs). If
distribution fees are not charged as a percentage of the periodic contribution into the plan,
they must be spread equally over a period of at least ten years.
6 During the accumulation
phase, the policyholder has the right to suspend the contract as well as to terminate the
contract by switching the cash value of the policy to a new provider.
In line with a certain minimum level of investor protection, only regulated financial
institution, like banks, life insurance companies and mutual fund companies, are allowed to
offer IPAs. In principle, these providers are free in the design of an IPA. In particular, the
Certification Act imposes no restrictions concerning the assets in which the providers invest
the contribution to back the pension accounts.
7 In addition, the supervisory authority does do
not check whether the risk and return characteristics of an IPA are economically feasible.
However, the provider of an IPA must promise the plan participant that the contract cash
4 An exemption is, that a part of the pension plan (min € 10,000 and max. € 50,000) can be withdrawn
during the accumulation phase to finance own house. This amount must be paid back (at a zero interest
rate) into the IPA before the beginning of the distribution phase.
5 In the case of a life annuity the provider must promise lifelong constant or increasing (monthly)
payments to the annuitant. In the case of a capital withdrawal plan (typically offered by mutual fund
and/or bank providers) at least 60% of the accumulated assets (but not less than the contributions paid
into the IPA) must be used for constant or rising periodic payments. At latest at the age of 85 the
balance must revert into a life annuity, whereas the benefits cannot be less than the last payment
received before that age. In addition, not more than 40% of the accumulated assets can be used for a
withdrawal plan with variable pension payments (reflecting the return of a specific asset portfolio).
6 Especially for traditional life insurance policies, it is conventional (until now) that distribution costs are
charged as front end loads on the first premiums (via the so-called zillmer-adjustment) resulting in no or
low early cash values for the policyholder.
7 An exemption are financial derivatives (e.g. option, futures, swaps), which can be used within an IPA
for hedging purposes only.4
value at retirement is at least equal to the contributions (including all extra payments by the
government) paid into the IPA.
8 This “money-back” guarantee, which was the core of an
intense and controversial debate during the social security reform in Germany, is the focus of
this paper. Advocates of the guarantee argue that it protects plan participants against a portion
of the downside volatility of capital market returns by providing them with a minimum rate of
return with respect to their lifetime contributions. However, the guarantee shapes the design
of saving products offered by the providers and raises the question about the economic costs
of such a promise.
9 Depending on the assets used to back the pension accounts, providers may
be exposed to shortfall risk, due to adverse movements in capital markets. If at retirement, the
value of the pension assets is lower than the sum of the contributions paid into the plan, the
IPA provider must fill the gap with its own equity capital. The problem faced by money
managers is therefore to find a product design, in conjunction with an appropriate investment
strategy, that protects the credibility of the guarantee in scenarios of negative investment
returns (hedging effectiveness), while still allowing for sufficient upside potential if capital
markets are booming (and thus avoiding excessive hedging costs). In addition, the guarantee
has important implications for regulators who must find an effective and efficient solvency
system for such saving schemes, especially for mutual funds.
The objective of this paper is to explore how this money-back guarantee works for products
which are offered by the German mutual fund industry. We evaluate alternative designs for
guarantee structures including a life cycle model (dynamic asset allocation), a plan with a pre-
specified blend of equity and bond investments (static asset allocation), and some type of
portfolio insurance. We use simulation to compare hedging effectiveness and hedging costs
associated with the provision of the money-back guarantee.
2. Long Term Shortfall-Risk and Return of Saving Plans
In order to make appropriate investment decisions under uncertainty, individuals must be able
to compare the risk and rewards of different asset classes. However, policymakers, regulators,
and providers are also interested in the long run performance of financial assets that back the
8 Not more than 15% of total contributions can be deducted from the principal guarantee level, if the IPA
include insurance coverage against disability. In the case of a switch to a new provider during the
accumulation phase, the policyholder gets from the new provider a guarantee on the policy’s cash value
a tt h et i m eo ft r a n s f e rp l u sn e wp r e m i u m s .
9 See also Lachance/Mitchell (2002)5
new pension products. The impact of the investment horizon on the risk of the various
financial assets is still a subject of intense and controversial debate within the academic
community and among investment professionals.
10 For example, a popular statement is that
stocks have a lower downside side risk in the long run than in the short run. A practical
guideline based on this argument is, that people should invest a higher fraction of their money
in stocks the younger they are, independent of preferences.
11 If the time horizon is long
enough, this approach would imply that people should invest 100% in stocks. To justify this
view, proponents call on the law of large numbers, which (seemingly) forces a phenomenon
called “time diversification”. Intuitively, this means that over a sufficiently long investment
horizon losses resulting from the high downside fluctuations will be compensated by gains
resulting from the high upside fluctuations of short-term stock returns. Some investment
advisors substantiate this argument empirically by pointing to historical returns and
demonstrating that stocks have outperformed bonds for every 10-, 15 or 20-year investment
period on record.
Nevertheless, it is well known in the academic literature that this is a misleading argument.
For example, Samuelson (1963) uses utility theory, Levy/Cohen (1998) use stochastic
dominance, and Bodie (1995, 2001) applies option pricing theory to demonstrate the logical
flaw in this conjecture. In addition, the use of historical return series implies that the 10-, 15-
or 20-year periods used are strongly overlapping and the resulting rollover multi-period
returns have a high degree of correlation, both of which result in a serious estimation bias.
2.1. Shortfall Risk Measures
In this section, we provide additional evidence concerning the impact of the time horizon on
the risk of the major financial asset classes, i.e. stocks and bonds in the German context. To
do so, we use alternative shortfall risk measures. The concept of shortfall risk is associated
with the possibility of “something bad happening”, in other words, falling short compared to a
required target (benchmark) return.
12 Returns below the target (losses) are considered to be
10 For surveys cf. Albrecht/Maurer/Ruckpaul (2001) and Kritzman/Rich (1998).
11 Cf. Bodie (2001) and Bodie (2002) for a critique of these simple arguments.
12 The concept of shortfall risk was introduced in finance by Roy (1952) and Kataoka (1963), expanded
and theoretically justified by Bawa (1975), and Fishburn (1977), (1982), (1984). It is widely applied to
investment asset allocation by Leibowitz/Bader/Kogelman (1996) and used by6
undesirable or risky, while returns above the target (gains) are desirable or non-risky. In this
sense, shortfall risk measures are called “relative” or “pure” measures of risk.
A popular measure to examine the downside risk of different investment vehicles is the
shortfall probability. Formally, let R denote the cumulative (multiyear) return of an
investment at a specific point in time. Then the shortfall probability is given by
SP Prob( ). Rz =< (1)
where z is the target (benchmark) which translates the total investment returns into gains or
losses. In the special case of a money back guarantee, the target is set equal to zero, i.e. the
shortfall occurs when the cash value of the policy is lower than the premiums paid into the
saving plan. Despite the popularity of this risk measure in the investment industry, it has a
major shortcoming. As Bodie (2001, p. 308) points out it “completely ignores how large the
potential shortfall might be”. If the same investment strategy can be repeated many times, the
shortfall probability only answers the question “how often” a loss might occur, but not “how
bad” such a loss might be.
To provide information about the potential extent of a loss, we calculate the Mean Excess
Loss (MEL), also known as conditional shortfall expectation, as an additional measure to
evaluate the long term shortfall-risk of financial assets. Formally, this risk index is given by
] E[ MEL z R R z < − = (2)
and it indicates the expected loss with respect to the benchmark, under the condition that a
shortfall occurs. Therefore, given a loss, the MEL answers the question “how bad on average”
the loss will be.
13 In this sense, the MEL can be considered a worst case-risk measure, since
the measure only considers the consequences of the mean shortfall-level assuming that a
shortfall happens.
A shortfall risk measure which connects the probability and the extent of the conditional
shortfall in an intuitive way is the shortfall expectation (SE):
Albrecht/Maurer/Ruckpaul (2001), Asness (1996), Butler/Domian (1991), Leibowitz/Krasker (1988)
and Zimmermann (1991) to judge the long term risk of stocks and bonds.
13 The MEL is closely connected with the Tail Conditional Expectation, which is given by TCE = E(RR
<z )=z–M E L .T h eT C Eh a ss o m ef a v o u r a b l ef e a t u r e s ,e . g .i ti s( i nc o n t r a s tt ot h es h o r t f a l l
probability) a coherent risk measure with respect to the axioms developed by Artzner et al. (1999). In
addition the MEL is a suitable version of the mean excess- respectively mean excess loss-function E(X
-z X > z) considered in extreme value theory. For extreme-value methods in financial risk
management cf. Borkovic/Klüppelberg (2000) and Embrechts/Resnick/Samorodnitsky (1999). Very
early, Gürtler (1929) introduced the MEL as “Mathematisches Risiko” to evaluate the underwriting risk
of insurance companies.7
MEL * SP )] 0 , E[max( SE = − = R z (3)
The shortfall expectation is the sum of losses weighted by their probabilities, and hence it is a
measure of the unconditional “average loss”. As equation (3) shows, the mean shortfall level
is simply the product of the shortfall probability and the mean level of shortfall given the
occurrence of a shortfall. In addition, the SE is, in a certain way, related to the price of an
insurance contract which would cover the shortfall. For example, the provider may have the
possibility of transferring the shortfall risk to the capital market by using appropriate
arbitrage-free put options. Then the shortfall expectation between the cash value of the
pension assets and the guarantee payment with respect to the risk adjusted (“martingale”)
probabilities discounted back at the risk-free interest rate, results in the (modified)
Black/Scholes (1973) option pricing formula.
14 If the provider transfers the shortfall risk to a
reinsurance company, the shortfall expectation could be seen as an important element of an
appropriate premium.
2.2. Calibration
In the remainder of this section, we quantify and compare the shortfall risk (in the sense
defined above) with respect to the preservation of principal of two saving plans. The first
invests the contribution into stock index fund units, represented by the German stock index
(DAX). The other saving plan is based on bond index fund units, which are represented by the
German bond index (REXP). The DAX stands for an index portfolio of German blue chips,
and the REXP for portfolio of German government bonds. Each of these indices is adjusted
for capital gains as well as dividends and coupon payments (on a pre-tax basis). We assume a
series of equal contributions paid at the beginning of each month up to the end of the
accumulation period, which ranges from 1 to 20 years.
To gain information about the relevant risk measures, we employ an ex ante approach by
imposing an exogenous structure on the probability distribution governing the uncertainty of
future asset returns. With such a model, it is possible to look into the future and compute the
risk measures in which we are interested. Due to the complexity of the underlying payment
structure of saving plans, there are no analytical closed form expressions for these risk-
14 The Black/Scholes formula follows directly only for a single lump sum pension payment and not for a
series of contributions; see also Lachance/Mitchell (2002).8
measures.
15 Therefore, we use Monte-Carlo simulation to generate a large number of paths for
the evolution of the saving plans.
The relevant statistics for the shortfall risk measures are then evaluated on the basis of these
scenarios. The stochastic dynamics of the (uncertain) market values of investment fund units
are modeled as geometric Brownian motion, which is standard in financial economics and can
be traced back to Bachelier (1900). This implies that the log returns of each type of index
fund are i.i.d. normally distributed. For the estimation of the process parameters
(drift/diffusion), we use the historical monthly log-returns of the DAX and REXP over the
period 1:1973-12:2001. The mean log rates of return for stocks (bonds) are 0.7967% p.m.
(0.5683% p.m.) and the corresponding standard deviation 5.58% p.m. (1.12% p.m.). To take
potential administration costs into account we subtract the equivalent of 0.5% p.a. from the
monthly average return on the investments.
16 Compatible with the current German mutual
fund fee structure, we take marketing costs into consideration by assuming front end sales
charges of 5% for the stock and 3% for the bond fund units.
With respect to these parameters and consistent with the model of a geometric Brownian
motion, 3,000,000 random paths for the development of the pension plan with an investment
horizon of 20 years (240 months) are generated.
17 For each simulation path i (i =1 ,… ,
3,000,000) we compute for each month t (t = 1, …, 240) the (uncertain) compounded
(multiyear) return, i.e.
.
P
P V
R
t
t t i,
t i,
−
= (4)
Here Vi,t stands for the cash value of the IPA in month t (t =1 ,… . ,T) in simulation run i (i =
1, …, n)a n dPt for the sum of contributions paid until month t. According to the money-back
guarantee, we set the benchmark return equal z = 0. With respect to this target, the relevant
risk parameters are then determined on the basis of the spectrum of possible future
developments.
15 As shown by Albrecht/Maurer/Ruckpaul (2001) the risk measures can be derived analytically in the
case of a lump sum investment.
16 Feldstein/Ranguelova/Samwick (2001, p. 60) use a similar procedure to account for potential
administration costs.
17 The large number of simulation paths is necessary to receive a precise picture of the worst case risk
measure MEL, especially when the shortfall probability is low.9
2.3. Results
We start with the results for the development of the expected (multiyear) return and the
shortfall probability of the stock and bond index fund over time. The graphs in Figure 1
suggest the well-known result that a German investor would have the potential to receive a
substantially higher expected return by investing in stocks instead of bonds. For example, in
the case of stocks at the end of a 20-year accumulation period, the investor can expect a
compounded return with respect to his contributions of 270%. For a saving plan based on
bond index funds, the expected return is only 109%. However, purchasing such an investment
exposes the plan participant to the volatility and therefore the downside risk of financial
markets.
Figure 1: Expected Compounded Return of Saving Plans in Stocks and Bonds
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Next we illustrate the results for the development of the shortfall probability of a saving plan
using stock and bond index funds over time. Figure 2 shows the well-known effect of time
diversification, i.e. the fact that the risk of not maintaining nominal capital decreases
monotonically with an increasing investment period, for bonds and stocks. However, the rate
and the extent of the risk reduction differ notably between the two investment vehicles. For
bond index funds, the shortfall probability is 37% for a yearly investment, and close to zero10
(i.e. lower than 0.1%) with an investment horizon of seven years onwards. In contrast, the
shortfall probability of a stock index fund does not converge as rapidly towards zero. Thus,
even for longer time horizons, the shortfall probability remains at a substantial level. For
example, the shortfall probability for a 12-month saving plan is 48.09%, and for accumulation
period of 20 years it is still 2.72%. In principle, these results confirm a characteristic which
Leibowitz/Krasker (1988) call persistence of risk.
Figure 2: Shortfall Probability Against a (nominal) 0% Target Rate of Return in Stock and
Bond Saving Plans
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Corresponding results for the mean excess loss (MEL) are presented in Figure 3. Saving plans
in stocks have an MEL that increases monotonically with the length of the accumulation
period, in contrast to bonds. For example, for an accumulation period of one year (i.e. 12
months) the conditional expected loss is 8.62% of the sum of the contribution paid into the
stock pension plan, while for a holding period of 20 years (i.e. 240 months) this risk index
increases to 16.53%. For a pension plan using bond index funds, the MEL is 1.63% after one
year, while for accumulation periods of 13 years onwards, none of the 3,000,000 simulation
paths produces a shortfall. Hence, with respect to the magnitude of a potential shortfall, the
popular argument that stocks become less risky in the long run is not true.11
This result is in line with Samuelson’s (1963) finding concerning the fallacy of the law of
large numbers. In addition, these results make clear that the use of the shortfall probability
alone is a misleading risk measure of stock investments in the long run. The worst-case aspect
of a long term investment in stocks is partly hidden by only taking the shortfall probability
into consideration. Recently Bodie (2002) provided the following very intuitive explanation
for this result “(..) the probability of a bad thing happening is only part of the risk equation.
Figure 3: Conditional Mean Expected Loss (MEL) Against a (nominal) 0% Target Rate of
Return in Stock and Bond Saving Plans
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The other part is the severity of that bad thing, and the further out you go, the more severe it
could be.” Thus, the elucidation of the worst-case risk embodied in a long-term investment in
stocks represents an additional piece of information that might be essential for investors.
Figure 4 shows how the unconditional shortfall expectation develops over time. For a saving
plan in bond index funds, both the probability of loss and the mean excess loss decrease with
the length of the time horizon. Because the shortfall expectation measures the net effect of
both risk components, it is also decreasing in time. For a stock-based saving plan, this risk
measure is also decreasing, i.e. the decreasing shortfall probability over-compensates the
increasing MEL, to a certain extent. However, in contrast to bonds, we can observe a risk12
persistence-characteristic in the stock fund: even for very long time horizons, the shortfall
expectation remains at a substantial level.
Figure 4: Expected Shortfall Against a (Nominal) 0% Target Rate of Return in Stock and
Bond Saving Plans
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In summary, even for long investment horizons, a pure stock investment is not free of the
downside risk of losing money. Hence it is not possible to perfectly smooth the negative
short-run fluctuations of stock returns over long horizons and simultaneously to keep
expected excess returns with certainty. Consequently, assets with low volatility and low
expected returns, like bonds, are not superfluous in the design of long-term saving products.
Insurance contracts covering the shortfall of a principal guarantees are not costless for a pure
stock investment, even for long investment horizons (see Lachance/Mitchell 2002).
For low volatility assets like a portfolio of government bonds, the probability and the severity
of losing money decreases over time. Over long investment horizons, the price to insure the
downside risk of a principal guarantee for a pure bonds investment is very low (close to zero).
Hence, bond pension plans are very effective vehicles for producing principal guarantees.
However, this does not mean that with a pure bond pension plan, the economic costs of
downside protection is zero. Providers of bond based IPA’s must give up a substantial part of13
the upside returns that are possible with stocks. From an ex ante point of view, a measure of
these economic (hedging) costs - in the sense of a smaller upside potential – can bee seen as
the difference between the expected return of both investment vehicles.
18
3. Regulatory Framework of Money-Back Guarantees for IPA: The
Case of Mutual Funds
The money-back guarantee as described in the German Certification Act can be represented as
a fixed liability of the provider, when it issues the IPA. If the cash value of the financial assets
backing the liabilities at the beginning of the retirement phase is lower than the sum of the
contributions paid into the policy, the provider must fill the gap with equity capital. From this
point of view, it is clear that the money-back guarantee should be subject to solvency
regulation.
Saving products offered by commercial banks (e.g. saving accounts) or insurance companies
(e.g. life insurance products) in Germany are usually designed (at least in part) with fixed
interest rates. However, this is not the case for mutual funds. The fundamental idea of a
collective investment scheme such as a mutual fund is to collect money from many private
investors via the offering of fund units, and to invest this money in a well-diversified portfolio
of stocks, bonds, and/or real estate. The units of the mutual fund are liquid in the sense that
they are traded on an active secondary market (e.g. for so-called exchange-traded-funds) or
investors can ask for redemption of their holdings to net-asset value prices at any point in
time. The investment management company usually assumes no obligation other than that of
investing the funds in a reasonable and prudent manner, solely in the interest of the investors.
It provides no guarantees with respect to a rate of investment return. Hence, the investor bears
all capital market risk and receives the full reward of the financial asset that backs the mutual
fund units. Because the balance sheets of mutual fund providers are not exposed to financial
market fluctuations, they are excluded from risk-based solvency capital regulation
requirements in Germany, in contrast to insurance companies and commercial banks.
19
18 Despite the fact that the expected return is the most common measure of the “reward”, “return” or
“value” of financial investments it is – especially in a downside risk context - possible to measure the
upside potential more directly, c.f. Holthausen (1981) or Albrecht/Maurer/Möller (1998).
19 According to German Investment Company Law (KAGG), the minimum equity capital for investment
fund management companies (i.e. the provider of the pension products) is € 2.5 Millions.14
By contrast, if the provider of an IPA is an investment management company which uses its
own mutual funds, the German Federal Banking Supervisory Authority (BAKred)
20 requires
(conditional) solvency capital because of the statutory “money back” guarantee. This
solvency requirement, published in December 2001, can be modelled in the following way.
Let Vt denote the cash value of an IPA at time t,a n dl e tPt bethe sum of the contributions
(including all extra payments by the government) paid into the policy until time t.
Furthermore, let rf(t,T)= :rf,t be the yield at time t on a zero coupon bond maturing at time T
(i.e. the planned age of retirement), taken from the current term structure of German interest
rates.
For each IPA, the investment management company must build solvency capital equal to 8%
of the total contributions paid into the plan
21 only, in each period t in which the risk-adjusted
cash value of the policy is lower than the present value of the contribution:
.
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In this formula
22 σ stands for the monthly volatility of the mutual fund units backing the
pension account. The volatility must be estimated from historical time series returns of the
fund unit prices using a window between two and five years. If the policy consists of more
than one type of mutual fund (e.g. equity and bond funds), σ is computed as the weighted sum
of the individual fund volatilities according to the current asset allocation of the policy.
The economic rationale behind this formula is as follows. At every point in time, the IPA
issuer has the safe investment alternative of investing some part of the contributions in zero
bonds, so that at the end of the investment period at time T the proceeds would equal the
participant’s contributions during the accumulation phase. The necessary amount to meet the
total contribution guarantee of Pt at time t is Pt /( 1+rf,t)
T-t, which is the right hand side of
formula (5). If the provider does not use zero bonds, but instead employes only stocks to back
the IPA, nothing happens as long as the cash value of the policy is “substantially” higher than
the present value of the contributions. “Substantially” higher means, under the German
20 Since Mai 2002 the BAKred is a Department of the new German Federal Financial Supervisory
Agency.
21 In addition to the solvency equity capital, investment management companies must build supplementary
reserves, if the difference between the present value of the contributions and the risk adjusted cash value
of the policy exceeds 8% of the total contributions.
22 The formula is explained in more detail in the appendix15
solvency rule, that given a current cash value of Vt there is a probability of only 1% (note 2.33
is the 99% quantile of the standard normal distribution) that the uncertain cash value of the
policy one month later Vt+1 is lower than the present value of the contributions. This explains
the risk adjustment on the left hand side of the solvency formula.
Hence, without capital requirements, an underfunding of the principal liability during the
accumulation period is possible. The amount to which such an underfunding is allowed
depends on the volatility of the pension assets and the time remaining to the end of the
accumulation period. For example (see Table 1), if the monthly returns of the pension assets
have a volatility of 7.22% per month which annualized is about 25% per year (a typical value
for German stock funds), the risk-free interest rate is 4% per annum, and the remaining
accumulation period is 30 years (360 months), then the critical level is only 35.8%. This
means that as long as the cash value of the policy exceeds 35.8% of the contribution paid into
the plan, no risk-based-solvency capital is necessary. If the time to retirement is only five
years (60 months), the critical level increases to 97.2%. However, the provider has the
possibility of reducing the volatility of the IPA and the possible amount of underfunding by
investing more of the pension assets in low volatility assets such as bonds.
Table 1: Critical Level of Under Funding (as % of Contributions) with Respect to
the Solvency Formula (5)
Volatility (per month)
End of plan
(Years) 0.29% 0.58% 0.87% 1.15% 1.44% 2.89% 5.77% 7.22%
30 30.5% 30.7% 30.9% 31.1% 31.3% 32.4% 34.6% 35.8%
25 37.2% 37.5% 37.7% 38.0% 38.2% 39.5% 42.3% 43.7%
20 45.4% 45.8% 46.1% 46.4% 46.7% 48.3% 51.6% 53.4%
15 55.5% 55.9% 56.2% 56.6% 57.0% 59.0% 63.1% 65.2%
10 67.8% 68.2% 68.7% 69.1% 69.6% 72.0% 77.0% 79.6%
5 82.7% 83.3% 83.8% 84.4% 85.0% 87.9% 94.0% 97.2%
3 89.6% 90.2% 90.8% 91.4% 92.0% 95.2% 101.8% 105.3%
2 93.3% 93.9% 94.5% 95.2% 95.8% 99.1% 106.0% 109.6%
1 97.1% 97.7% 98.4% 99.0% 99.7% 103.1% 110.3% 114.1%
Source: Authors’ Computations
In summary, with an appropriate asset allocation and depending on the age of the participant,
it is possible for the provider of mutual fund-based IPA to avoid capital requirements without
jeopardizing the credibility of the principal guarantee. However, the burden of such a16
conditional solvency system is the implementation of an efficient risk monitoring system for
each IPA.
4. Hedging Costs and Hedging Effectiveness of Mutual Fund Products
In view of our results concerning the long-run risks of pure stock investments, and given the
regulatory environment placing a significant capital charge on a fund with too much shortfall
risk, it is clear that a sensible strategy for a mutual fund must contain some element of risk
management or hedging. As mentioned above, the problem is to provide sufficient credibility
for the promised payments (hedging effectiveness) while at the same time reducing the upside
potential of the investment as little as possible, to keep hedging costs low. Note that the term
“hedging costs” refers neither to the regulatory capital the mutual fund company has to
provide nor to potential expenditures for the purchase of derivative contracts. The only source
of hedging costs for the products considered below is a reduction in average expected wealth
or, equivalently, in the total return on the contributions paid into the IPA.
Because of the substantial positive correlation of the financial assets backing the pension
plans, an IPA provider cannot manage the risk resulting from guarantees by using traditional
insurance pooling techniques.
23 Hence it is necessary to manage underlying risk of the
principal guarantee for each IPA individually.
4.1. Methodology
We focus on products currently offered by German mutual fund companies, and we compare
them to the simple strategies of investing in stocks or bonds exclusively. In total, we analyze
five strategies with respect to their long-run risk-return profile:
a. Pure stock strategy
This strategy was discussed above with respect to its long-run risks. Given the parameter
values used in our simulation study, this strategy will likely produce the highest expected
wealth at the end of the investment period. On the other hand, this strategy can be quite
costly for the mutual fund company if it must put up substantial solvency capital to render
credible its payment promises.
23 See also Lachance/Mitchell (2002)17
b. Pure bond strategy
A pure bond strategy follows the opposite approach. To reduce the risk of falling short of
the promised wealth at the end of the accumulation period, this strategy invests only in
bonds or broadly diversified government bond portfolios. One might expect that this
reduces or even completely eliminates the shortfall risk, but this benefit also comes at the
cost of lower expected returns.
c. Static portfolio strategy
This strategy is a mixture of the pure bond and the pure stock strategy. The portfolio
remains unchanged over the whole period, and it contains both stocks and bonds from the
start. With reference to the typical asset allocation of German retirement funds (AS-
Funds)
24 our simulations for the 15-year horizon use an equally weighted stock and bond
portfolio, whereas for the 30-year investment period we use 75% stocks and 25% bonds.
d. Life-cycle strategy
Popular advice often given to investors is to alter the portfolio composition with age.
People are usually advised to hold a larger share of the portfolio in stocks when young,
and then to shift into bonds later on. The idea behind this strategy is that it would be hard
to compensate unfavorable movements on the stock market occurring late in the
accumulation period, since little time is left, so that this type of risk could be avoided by
investing in bonds. The life-cycle strategy is an unconditional ‘hedge’ in the sense that
more volatile return opportunities are generally considered too dangerous late in the
investment period, irrespective of the performance of stocks before the rebalancing date.
We implement this strategy by defining fixed points in time at which the portfolio
composition is changed, with more and more weight on bonds instead of stocks. The exact
dates and compositions are as follows: For an investment horizon of 15 years the plan is
assumed to start with 40 percent of the allocations going into equity and 60 percent into
bonds. After five years this allocation changes, and for the remaining time 10 percent go
into stocks and 90 percent into bonds. In the case of a 30 year plan there is an initial
period of ten years with pure stock investment, followed by five years with an allocation
of 70 percent equity and 30 percent bonds. After another five years the allocation of the
contributions is again changed to 40 percent equity and 60 percent bonds. Over the
remaining ten years 90 percent of the contributions go into bond funds and the remaining
10 percent into stocks.
e. Conditional hedging strategy
This strategy aims at combining the performance advantage of a pure stock strategy with
the risk-reducing effect of a pure bond strategy. As opposed to the life cycle strategy,
however, the decision to shift from one investment into the other is not driven by an
exogenous variable like age, but rather by the performance of the respective investments.
For this reason, such a strategy represents a “conditional hedging” approach. Usually one
starts out with a pure stock investment and shifts to bonds as soon as a certain critical
level of wealth is reached. In this case, subsequent contributions go in bonds until the
safety level is again exceeded, when the strategy switches back to a 100 percent stock
investment. An important parameter for this type of strategy is the critical level of wealth
at which the investment rule (for subsequent contributions) changes. To link this critical
24 AS-Fonds (Altersvorsorge-Sondervermögen) are special mutual fund products regulated in the
Investment Management Company Act, which the German government introduced in 1998 for
retirement saving. In contrast to usual balanced funds, AS-Fonds can invest into real estate, require a
saving plan of a least 18 years, and are subject to some quantitative investment restrictions. For more
details see Laux/Siebel (1999).18
value to the intervention line set by the regulatory authorities in Germany (see formula 5),
we set the critical level of wealth (as an example) to 75% above the intervention value
defined according to the solvency formula (5).
A possibility not discussed up to now is the use of derivative assets to protect the value of an
investment plan against shortfall risk. The appropriate instrument here would be a put option
on the value of the plan with a strike price equal to the sum of the nominal payments.
However, the application of put options in this context is not without problems. First of all,
due to the very long maturity of the savings plans, any option would be very expensive, and
the cost would have to be paid up front, i.e. at the beginning of the accumulation period,
which raises the financing question. Second, it seems unlikely that a put with such a long time
to maturity would be offered at all, so that a roll-over strategy would become necessary, with
all the risks involved in terms of prices and liquidity. Third, for the put option to be of real
value to the institution holding it, it would have to be made sure that the seller can actually
cover its liabilities at the end of the accumulation period. This does not seemwithout problems
in practice, so that there would always be doubts concerning the actual risk-reduction
potential of such an option. Finally, there is a significant operational problem in using put
options, since all the accounts have to be protected individually. This means that for every
IPA, the provider would have to hold a put option with the appropriate strike price and time to
maturity. This seems by far too costly and complicated for the typical institution, so that
hedging strategies using ‘physical’ financial derivatives will not be considered further in the
following analysis.
We analyze the five strategies described above in terms of wealth levels (or total returns) and
required regulatory capital. Since there are no closed-form expressions for the statistics of
interest, we use Monte Carlo simulation to generate a large number of paths for the evolution
of the savings plans. The relevant statistics for total returns (relative to a benchmark) and
regulatory capital are then evaluated on the basis of these scenarios. The key ingredient in
such a simulation is a suitable model to describe the dynamics of the relevant funds and the
short rate of interest. For the funds we use the standard capital market model, representing
asset price movements by means of correlated Wiener processes. The dynamics of the short
rate are given by the one-factor model suggested by Cox/Ingersoll/Ross (CIR, 1985). While
we assume constant correlations between the risk factors, the covariances will vary due to the
fact that the conditional standard deviation for the short rate will in general not be equal to the
unconditional value.19
The time series used to estimate the process parameters (mean returns, volatilities,
correlations) are the monthly log returns of the German stock index DAX representing the
stock index fund, the log returns of the bond performance index REXP as the bond index fund
as well as the 1-year interest rate as a proxy for the short rate. Parameters were estimated via a
maximum-likelihood approach, the estimates are presented in table 2 and 3. As discussed
above we subtracted the equivalent of 0.5% p.a. from the monthly average return on the
investments to take potential administration costs into account.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Risk Factors 1:1973-12:2001
Correlations Asset Mean
(% p.m.)
Volatility
(% p.m.) Stocks Bonds
Stocks 0.7967 5.5800 1 0.2051
Bonds 0.5683 1.1200 1
Source: Authors’ Computations
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for the Short Rate Process 1:1973-12:2001
Correlations Innovations with
Kappa Theta Sigma
Stock Returns Bond Returns
0.1494 0.0539 0.0511 0.1417 -0.7009
The process estimated is the CIR process t t t t dW r dt r dr σ θ κ + − = ) (, w h e r e K a p p a ( κ)i s
the speed of mean-reversion, Theta (θ) is the long-run mean of the short rate, and Sigma (σ)i s
the volatility of changes in the short rate. dWt is the increment of a standard Wiener process.
Source: Authors’ Computations.
The CIR process is very popular in interest rate modeling. This is mainly due to the fact that it
is able to generate both mean-reversion in interest rates as well as non-negative rates with
probability one. Since the process exhibits mean-reversion, the sign of the drift component
(i.e., the expected change in the short rate over the next time interval) depends on whether the
process is currently above or below its long-run mean. How quickly the process reverts back
to this long-run mean is determined by the speed of mean-reversion. In table 3 κ (kappa)
represents this speed of mean reversion, θ (theta) stands for the long-run mean of the interest
rate, while σ (sigma) denotes the volatility of changes in the short rate. The market price of
interest rate risk was set equal to zero for reasons of simplicity.20
To ensure stability of the simulation results, we base our analysis on 3,000,000 simulations
for each of the respective strategies. We then compute
•  statistics related to hedging costs: the mean of the total return generated by the
respective strategies for the different points in time (months)
•  statistics related to hedging effectiveness: the shortfall risk and the required regulatory
capital for the respective strategies.
The model assumes equal contributions into the plan occurring at the beginning of each
month, and a front-end load of 5% proportional to the unit price for the stock fund and 3% for
the bond fund. These loads are comparable to the current German mutual fund fee structure.
Vi,t denotes the uncertain total wealth of the IPA in month t (t =1 ,… . ,T) in simulation run i (i
=1 ,… ,n), and zi,t represents the critical level of wealth in month t according to formula (5)
determined by the federal banking supervisory authority (BAKred).
25 If Pt represents the sum
of payments into the plan until time t, the average compounded (multiyear) return (EWt)o f
the IPA at the end of month t is given by:
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The probability of a solvency capital charge (CPt) in month t is estimated by:
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where the indicator variable I(a, b)(X) is equal to one if X ∈ (a, b) and zero otherwise. The
mean solvency capital charge (MCt) at time t month after the beginning of the plan
normalized by the sum of the contributions Pt paid into the IPA, is given by
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According to the regulatory authorities, the solvency capital charge Ci,t depends on how far
the mutual funds based IPA wealth falls short of the critical level. The rule says that the
capital charge is at least 8% when wealth falls below the critical level. If the amount of the
shortfall exceeds 8%, the capital charge is increased accordingly to cover the gap. Hence Ci,t
must to be calculated according to the following formula:
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25 C.f. BAKred (2001).21
The mean conditional capital charge (MCCt) at month t given that a capital charge has
occured is computed according to:
. /CP MC MCC t t t = (10)
4.2. Results
Our results for the expected total return of savings plans based on the different investment
strategies are given in Table 4. It is no surprise that the pure stock strategy does best in terms
of this measure, since stocks have the highest expected monthly return. This also causes the
differences between the respective strategies to increase with time. Nevertheless, it is
interesting to note how close the conditional hedge strategy comes in terms of expected total
return. Even after 30 years, the difference to the pure stock strategy is only about 3.5 percent
of the contributions paid. This can be taken as a first indication that this type of strategy might
an interesting compromise between the return potential of a pure stock strategy and the risk-
avoiding property of a pure bond approach.
Table 4: Expected Total Return (in % of contributions)
The table gives the expected total compounded return for the different IPA plans at different
points in time for a 30 year accumulation period (numbers in parentheses are for an
accumulation period of 15 years). For example, an entry of 16.26 for the 100% bond strategy
in year 5 means that the value of an IPA with an investment horizon of 30 years is after five
years on average 16.26% higher than the sum of the contributions over the first five years.
Year 1 5 10 15 30
100% bond 0.80
(0.80)
16.26
(16.26)
40.17
(40.17)
70.67
(70.67)
225.38
(―)
100% stock 1.38
(1.38)
29.09
(29.09)
78.78
(78.78)
154.06
(154.06)
731.60
(―)
Static 1.72
(1.08)
26.31
(22.44)
68.79
(58.03)
130.38
(107.36)
554.59
(―)
Life-cycle 1.38
(1.03)
29.09
(21.39)
78.78
(46.73)
140.13
(81.36)
384.93
(―)
Cond. Hedge 1.38
(1.33)
29.09
(26.07)
78.77
(67.40)
153.93
(126.54)
728.06
(―)
Source: Authors’ Computations
Nevertheless, expected wealth is just one measure to be considered; any sensible comparison
of the given products must also focus on risk measures. The risk of the different strategies is
measured by the regulatory capital charge that the mutual fund company adopting these
strategies would face. Table 5 indicates that, for an investment horizon of 30 years, no
regulatory capital is needed over the first five years for any of the strategies. The pure bond22
strategy can even be regarded as entirely risk-free with respect to regulatory capital charges.
The life-cycle approach also exhibits very low capital charges on average. This strategy seems
to be an interesting alternative to a pure bond investment, given its advantage in terms of
expected return.
Table 5: Mean Regulatory Capital Charge (as % of Contributions)
The table gives the average regulatory capital that has to be put up for the different IPA plans
at different points in time for a 30 year accumulation period (numbers in parentheses are for
an accumulation period of 15 years). For example, an entry of 0.04 for the static strategy in
year 30 means that in this year on average 0.04 percent of the contributions made over 30
years have to be provided as regulatory capital.
Year Strategy
1 5 10 15 30
100% bond 0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
100% stock 0
(0)
0
(0.07)
<0.01
(0.68)
0.01
(1.67)
0.28
(―)
Static 0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0.01)
0.01
(0.08)
0.04
(―)
Life-cycle 0
(0)
0
(0)
<0.01
(0)
<0.01
(<0.01)
0
(―)
Cond. Hedge 0
(0)
0
(<0.01)
<0.01
(0.01)
<0.01
(0.06)
0.08
(―)
Source: Authors’ Computations
As expected, the pure stock strategy balances its high return potential with an ‘expensive’
regulatory capital level. It requires more than three times the regulatory capital than the
conditional hedge strategy, which is in second place with respect to this criterion.
Furthermore, Table 5 provides insight into the impact of the investment horizon. Long-term
strategies generally exhibit lower risk than the 15-year plans with the only exception being the
life-cycle strategy. The fundamental reason for longer-term strategies requiring less regulatory
capital than shorter-term strategies is the discounting embedded in the critical solvency ratio
set by the regulatory authorities. This means that the required minimum wealth level of a plan
is the lower the longer the remaining time to maturity of the plan. For the life-cycle strategy,
however, there are two effects to be considered. For the shorter horizon plan, the period of
pure stock investment is rather short, so the risk in general decreases. To take the most
pronounced example for the usual impact of the investment horizon, consider the pure stock
strategy. The average capital increases dramatically compared to the 30 year-plan, so that this
approach looks very costly when it is implemented over this short investment horizon.23
The probability that the mutual fund company will be required to put capital aside is given in
Table 6, and the results are qualitatively similar to Table 5. The pure bond strategy never
forces the provider to put up capital, whereas the pure stock does with a significant likelihood.
Again, time is an important factor here. For the 30 year horizon, the probability of a capital
charge for any strategy never exceeds 1.4 percent, but for a 15 year pure stock plan, this
probability is almost 9 percent at the end of the investment period. For the other strategies,
the ratios of 15-year to 30-year probabilities are also quite high, so that if a plan actually
exhibits the risk of a capital charge, this risk tends to increase for shorter horizons.
Table 6: Probability of a Regulatory Capital Charge (in %)
The table gives the average frequency (or probability) of the event that regulatory capital has
to be put up for the different IPA plans at different points in time for a 30 year accumulation
period (numbers in parentheses are for an accumulation period of 15 years). For example, an
entry of 0.07 for the 100% stock strategy in year 15 means that in this year in 0.07 percent of
the cases regulatory capital had to be provided. Numbers in parentheses represent results for
an investment horizon of 15 years.
Year Strategy
1 5 10 15 30
100% bond 0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
100% stock 0
(0)
0
(0.67)
<0.01
(4.78)
0.07
(8.98)
1.40
(―)
Static 0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0.06)
<0.01
(0.74)
0.25
(―)
Life-cycle 0
(0)
0
(0)
<0.01
(0)
<0.01
(<0.01)
0
(―)
Cond. Hedge 0
(0)
0
(<0.01)
<0.01
(0.08)
0.01
(0.62)
0.64
(―)
Source: Authors’ Computations
We also note that there is an important difference between shortfall probability and the
probability of a regulatory capital charge. As shown above, the shortfall probability of a pure
stock investment actually falls with a longer investment horizon, whereas the probability of a
capital charge goes up. Again this is due to the fact that the critical level of wealth set by the
German regulatory authorities contains a discounting component. Thus this critical level will
go up with decreasing time to maturity, thereby causing a higher likelihood for a capital
charge.
The average conditional regulatory capital charge depicted in Table 7 shows how much
capital will be needed given that the cash value of the IPA falls below the critical BaKred
value. Note that when the empirical probability of a capital charge is zero, this measure is not24
defined. The Table shows results qualitatively similar to the general long-run risk-return
profile of the various asset classes. The risk of a pure stock strategy becomes obvious, since
if regulatory capital is needed, it will probably be a significant amount. For example, at the
end of 30 years the mutual fund company would need on average almost 20 percent of the
contributions as regulatory capital in those scenarios where wealth falls below the critical
BaKred value. The benefits of flexibility become obvious when the static strategy is
compared with the conditional hedge. The conditional hedge produces, on average, higher
wealth over the whole investment period and the average conditional regulatory capital is also
lower. So if one were to compare the different products on the basis of these two measures
only, the static strategy would be dominated. Note, however, that the probability of a capital
charge is lower for the static strategy.
Table 7: Mean Conditional Regulatory Capital Charge (as % of Contributions)
The table gives the average conditional regulatory capital that has to be put up for the
different IPA plans at different points in time for a 30 year accumulation period (numbers in
parentheses are for an accumulation period of 15 years), i.e. the average amount of regulatory
capital that is necessary, given that regulatory capital has to be put up at all. For example, an
entry of 9.00 for the conditional hedge strategy in year 15 means that in this year on average
9.00 percent of the sum of contributions over the first 15 years had to be provided as
regulatory capital in those cases where capital had to be put up at all. Note that this number is
not defined (‘n.def.’), if the empirical probability of having to provide regulatory capital is
equal to zero.
Year Strategy
1 5 10 15 30
Pure bond n.def.
(n.def.)
n.def.
(n.def.)
n.def.
(n.def.)
n.def.
(n.def.)
n.def.
(n.def.)
Pure stock n.def.
(n.def.)
n.def.
(9.92)
9.46
(14.31)
11.59
(18.63)
19.90
(―)
Static n.def.
(n.def.)
n.def.
(n.def.)
n.def.
(8.75)
9.31
(10.17)
14.71
(―)
Life-cycle n.def.
(n.def.)
n.def.
(n.def.)
9.46
(n.def.)
8.04
(8.00)
n.def.
(―)
Cond. Hedge n.def.
(n.def.)
n.def.
(8.06)
8.00
(8.90)
9.00
(9.95)
13.29
(―)
Source: Authors’ Computations
The analyses thus far focus on the statistical output, but it is also important to assess the
administrative costs generated by each plan. Cost will not be major for the strategy products
such as the pure bond, the pure stock plans, the static, and the life-cycle strategies. However,
for the conditional hedge, the need to shift incoming distributions across asset classes
depending on how much wealth has been accumulated in the plan, might imply considerable
administrative effort. It is therefore of interest to examine the relative frequency of shifts from25
one asset class to the other, when a conditional hedge strategy is run. Here again, time is an
important factor, since for the 15-year plan the mutual fund company must change the asset
class in 98 percent of the paths generated by the simulation, whereas this need arises in only
26 percent of the cases for the longer horizon. In any case, costs must be taken into account
when strategies are compared with respect to their practical application.
In summary it is not possible to identify the overall dominating investment product or
strategy. With a few exceptions, higher potential in terms of average wealth usually comes at
the cost of higher regulatory capital. It is important in this context to look at the average
amount of regulatory capital conditional on the event that capital actually has to be put aside.
Here it becomes obvious that strategies with a fixed stock investment can produce significant
risks. This risk is mitigated when the conditional hedge strategy is employed. Nevertheless,
additional administrative cost must be considered.
5. Conclusions
Due to the severe financing problems of standard pay-as-you-go pension systems in many
countries alternative vehicles for retirement financing have to be developed. In Germany such
a new system was recently installed when the German Retirement Saving Act was passed by
the legislative body. The government offers significant tax relief for investment products
meeting certain requirements, the most important of these being a guarantee offered by the
company selling the product that the cash value of the IPA at the end of the accumulation
period is at least as high as the nominal sum of the contributions. To lend sufficient credibility
to the payment promises made by institutions providing investment products for these savings
plans, the regulatory authorities in Germany have imposed a capital charge in case the value
of the savings plan falls below a certain critical level.
At first sight it seems that in order to implement such a principal guarantee complicated and
expensive financial products, like derivatives, are needed. However, as we have shown in this
paper, there are other ways of achieving a sometimes practically risk-free position without
using options or similar instruments. We analyze in detail various strategies, which aim at
combining the potentially return-increasing properties of equity investment with the risk-26
reducing characteristics of bond investments. These strategies are (in principal) actually
implemented in products offered in Germany, so that their analysis is a real-world application
of the tools and methods of capital market theory. Of course, the trade-off between return and
risk is always at the core of the analysis. However, in the context of this paper it is important
to recognize that variance is not the most important measure of risk. As opposed to a more
traditional approach we consider shortfall and the need of regulatory capital as the two most
important types of risk.
The strategies analyzed in this paper range from simple pure bond or equity investments over
mixed equity-bond funds and products offering a change in portfolio composition at pre-
defined points in time to highly sophisticated products with conditionally changing
investment styles. One of the key results of our study is that these dynamic strategies,
switching from stocks into bonds whenever the value of the savings plan falls below some
critical solvency ratio set by regulatory authorities, perform for long investment horizons
rather well in terms of expected total returns. They come close to pure stock investments with
respect to the average value they generate for the investor. However, it is also very important
for the financial institution to keep an eye on the expected amount of regulatory capital
required by a certain investment strategy. Due to the conditional change in allocation when
the critical regulatory value is reached, the expected capital charge is significantly smaller
than in the case of a pure equity investment.
Besides the basic type of strategy, the length of the investment horizon is an important factor
for the risks and rewards of alternative strategies. In general, the longer the maturity of the
plan, the lower the expected capital charge, since the critical level set by the authorities in
Germany contains a discount factor, and the higher the expected total return. Nevertheless, it
is important to consider other risk variables as well in this
We are far from claiming that one of the strategies discussed in this paper should be seen as
uniformly superior to any other. It was our intention to point out the benefits and risks offered
by the different types of products to provide a basis for a thorough discussion of the issues
involved in product design and regulation.27
Appendix: Derivation of the Solvency Formula
Consider an investment plan where payments into an IPA are made at equally spaced points in
time t = 0, 1,...,T (e.g. months). Let Pt denote the sum of payments up to time t, T the planned
terminal date of the plan (equal to the beginning of the payout phase), and q(rf,t,T - t ) =
(1+rf,t)
t-T the discount factor with risk-free rate rf,t and remaining time to maturity T-t. Without
loss of generality we assume that the investor holds exactly one share of the fund at time t.
We are interested in the solvency ratio Vt / Pt at time t, which makes sure that the uncertain
market value of the shares Vt+1 at time t+1 is less than the sum of payments Pt into the plan
discounted up to time T,i . e .l e s st h a nPt⋅q(rf,t, T-t-1), with a probability of at most ε.
To be able to quantify this shortfall risk we have to specify a model for the random evolution
of the value of the investment shares. Here we make the standard assumption that the
dynamics of this value can be described by a geometric Brownian motion. This implies that
the relative change in value (i.e. the log-return) ln(Vt+1)–l n ( Vt) is normally distributed with
mean m und variance s². Formally we obtain the desired solvency ratio as the solution of the
following inequality:
Prob[Vt+1 < Pt⋅q(rf,t, T-t-1)] = Prob[ln(Vt+1)<l n ( Pt⋅q(rf,t, T-t-1))] § ε (A1)
Using the above distributional assumption inequality (A1) is equivalent to
ln(Vt)+m¥ln(Pt)+l n [ q(rf,t, T-t-1)] + N1-ε ⋅ s,( A 2 )
where N1-ε is the (1-ε)-quantile of the cumulative standard normal distribution. Under the
additional (conservative) assumption
26 that the one-period expected return is equal to zero
(i.e, m = 0) inequality (A2) can be written as
Vt /e x p [ N 1-ε ⋅ s] ¥ Pt⋅q(rf,t, T-t-1). (A3)
Setting N1-ε = 2.33, which implies a tolerated shortfall probability of not more than 1%, this
represents the equation for the solvency ratio (5) presented in the main text.
26 This assumption is indeed conservative, since it increases the shortfall probability compared to the common
case m > 0. Furthermore it is no longer necessary to estimate expected returns (e.g., from historical time series),
which are subject to much larger estimation risks than volatilities. See for example Merton (1980).28
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